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Social scientists dealing with business and politics have tended to focus mostly on the 
power of business and less on the political challenges and constraints that business interest 
groups face. This paper analyses how business interest groups respond to political 
initiatives that challenge their interests, using four episodes of political conflict in Germany. 
The paper elaborates a model of response strategies and their likely impact on political 
outcomes. The model suggests that business interest groups can respond to political 
challenges in two ways: by seeking confrontation or by pursuing adaptation. The paper 
illustrates these two response strategies with four episodes of political conflict in the 
political-economic history of Germany: (i) the adoption of social insurance under 
Bismarck, (ii) the adoption of unemployment insurance in the 1920s, (iii) the adoption of 
board-level codetermination in the early 1950s, (iv) and the Agenda 2010 labour market 
reforms of the early 2000s. These four case studies show that adaptation facilitates social 
compromise, while confrontation results in a bifurcated outcome, producing either 
dominance or defeat of business interests, depending on what side government takes.  
Furthermore, the analysis finds that confrontation tends to be associated with unity of 
interests within the business community, while adaptation tends to be associated with 
fragmentation of interests. The discussion emphasises that the role of business in politics 
should not be seen solely in terms of business ‘influencing’ politics, but also as potentially 
adaptive. 
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This paper addresses the following question: How do business interest groups deal with political 
challenges? Most research on the political role of business (a short form for business interest 
groups) focuses on the mechanisms, causes, and forms of business influence in politics. In this 
vein, there are numerous studies of how business interest groups exert political influence and 
how successful they are in getting what they want (for example, Bell and Hindmoor 2013; Bell 
and Hindmoor 2014; Block 1987; Culpepper and Reinke 2013; Fairfield 2010; Marsh and Lewis 
2013; Svallfors 2016; van Apeldoorn 2000; Vogel 1989). Business enjoys considerable power, and 
this power is derived from both structural sources, the dependence of society on investments by 
private firms, and on instrumental sources, such as lobbying and donations.  
 Even though business interest groups are powerful, they do however not always get what 
they want. Business interest groups confront demands by other political actors endowed with 
power resources, demands that may or may not conflict with how the business community, or 
segments within it, sees its interests. Thus, the preferences of business interest groups, while 
influential, do as a rule not determine political decisions. 
 The most important constraint on business influence is democracy. One major goal of 
political parties is to win elections. Business people, that is, the owners and senior executives of 
private firms, constitute a minority of the electorate. Political parties and governments face 
incentives to comply with business demands – due to the structural and instrumental power of 
business – but they also face the potentially conflicting incentive of satisfying voter preferences. 
When preferences of a large share of voters conflict with the preferences of the business 
community or a large segment of it, policy-makers and parties need to decide whether to side 
with the respective business interest group or with the respective voter segment. In short, while 
business interest groups enjoy considerable resources to ensure political influence, both 
instrumental and structural, other social groups enjoy other sources of influence, in particular 
those that stem from their larger electoral size. Governments do not necessarily or invariably give 
precedence to business interests when those conflict with voter preferences. Business interests 
may therefore possibly be undermined or soundly defeated by large voter segments.  
 Recent research on business power and influence has focused on factors that may either 
enhance, undermine or reduce business influence. These factors include the state of the economy 
and the incidence of economic crises (Vogel 1989; Vogel 1996), the credibility of exit threats (Bell 
and Hindmoor 2013; Bell 2012), the extent of informational advantages enjoyed by business over 
policy-makers (Bernhagen 2007), the extent of regulatory competition across polities(Hacker and 
Pierson 2002), and  the salience of policy issues to the public (Culpepper 2011).  
 These studies provide valuable insights into the sources of variation of business influence. 
Yet the impact of business interest groups on political decisions depends not only on their 
influence but also on whether, and if so how, they adapt to the goals of those actors who pose a 
challenge to their interests, actors whom I call ‘challengers’. The purpose of this paper is to 
analyse how business interest groups deal with situations where their political clout is weakened 
by actors who challenge their interests. What do business interest groups do when political 
challengers are sufficiently strong to constrain business interest groups’ ability to get what they 
want? How do they respond to these political challenges? 
 This paper suggests that business can respond to political challenges in two ways: 
confrontation or adaptation. Hence, business interest groups might become more assertive and 
intensify their activities to achieve their goals. If challengers are strong, this will lead to 
confrontation. Alternatively, business interest groups may assess that an uncompromising 
attitude is likely to lead to defeat, and may thus moderate their demands; in this case compromise 
and political accommodation will be viewed as the politically more expedient strategy. The choice 
of response strategy, confrontation or adaptation, has important consequences for the viability of 
social compromise, in so far as adaptation facilitates compromise on both sides. 
 The paper explores the effects of these choices on political outcomes. I argue that these 
effects will depend on the intensity of the political constraints. The paper proposes a two-
dimensional typology: The two dimensions are (a) the intensity of political constraints faced by 
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business, and (b) the response strategy chosen by business (adaptation/confrontation). The 
combination of these two dimensions results in a cross-tab with four possible outcomes (see 
table 1). The paper illustrates this typology with examples taken from the historical development 
of the welfare state and institutions of codetermination in Germany. 
 The empirical analysis shows how business’ choice of response strategy affects political 
outcomes. The outcomes possible are modelled as either defeat of business, forms of social 
compromise, or victory of business. When German business interest groups adapted to political 
constraints, this often resulted in social compromise where business could shape certain policy 
details but also had to make concessions. In cases where business opted for confrontation, the 
political outcome depended on the strength of these constraints. Hence, if the constraints were 
strong, a confrontation strategy failed and business interests were defeated; if the constraints 
were weak, confrontation resulted in victory.  
 More generally, through this analysis, the paper intends to show that a focus on how 
business responds to political challenges results in a better understanding of the role of business 
in politics, as compared to an approach that takes business dominance in politics as the norm and 
challenges to business dominance as insignificant. Taking into account that the strategic choices 
made by business interest groups are affected by the political challenges they face provides us 
with a more nuanced understanding of business-politics relations. This understanding takes into 
account both the power business enjoys, as well as the constraints it faces, with the outcome 
dependent on a combination of the strategic choices business makes and the political constraints 
it faces. 
 The paper is organised as follows: the next section revisits theoretical debates on the role 
of business in politics, arguing that a focus on response strategies and adaptation complements 
and improves existing approaches. The third section presents the typology of business-politics 
relations and spells out its theoretical implications for our understanding of how business and 
politics interact. The fourth section shows the utility of this typology by applying it to several key 
policy-making episodes in the development of welfare state and codetermination legislation in 
Germany. The final section offers a conclusion and discusses possible reasons why business 
sometimes pursues confrontation, and sometimes adaptation. 
 
2. Theoretical debates on business-politics relations 
To understand the role how business interest groups affect the politics and policies in liberal 
democracies, we need to briefly revisit debates about the nature of relations between business 
and politics. We can identify two strands of thinking in these debates: power elite theories and 
pluralist theories. The first strand sees power in politics as located in a coherent, tightly 
connected social elite that shares a common worldview, an elite within which the owners and 
senior executives of large corporations form an important part. The second strand of thinking 
views power structures in democracies as characterised by competition among a multitude of 
social interest groups, with no one group being able to permanently monopolise power. 
 We can trace back the intellectual pedigree of these two strands to Karl Marx and Joseph 
Schumpeter, respectively. In their Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels famously declared that 
‘[t]he power of the modern state is merely a device for administering the common affairs of the 
whole bourgeois class’ (Marx and Engels 1971 [1848]). From the 1960s, a strand of Marxist work 
emerged that theorises, and to some degree tried to empirically document, the dominance of 
capitalist interests in politics (Poulantzas 1978 [1973]; Poulantzas 1969; Miliband 1973 [1969]; 
Jessop 1983). Arguments about business dominance in politics are central also to non-Marxist 
versions of power elite theory, notably the work of the sociologists Wright Mills (1999  [1956]), 
Useem (1984), and Domhoff (Domhoff 1996; Domhoff 1990; Domhoff 1967).  
 The pedigree of pluralist perspectives goes back to the work of the economist Joseph A. 
Schumpeter and the theory of democracy he developed in Part IV of his book Capitalism, 
Socialism, and Democracy (Schumpeter 2010 [1942]). Central to Schumpeter’s view of democracy is 
the importance of competition for power through a struggle for votes (Schumpeter 2010 [1942]). 
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According to Schumpeter, the rise of democracy is causally connected to capitalism (Schumpeter 
2010 [1942]). Schumpeter emphasised the inability of business interest groups to control 
democracy because of popular demands of an anti-business character and the empowerment of 
these demands by democracy (Schumpeter 2010 [1942]). 
 The pluralist perspective also inspired a rich body of empirical work. Important examples 
of work in the pluralist tradition are, in particular, the work by David Vogel on the impact of 
business interest groups in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s in the fields of 
consumer protection, environmental policies, and occupational health and safety (Vogel 1987; 
Vogel 1983; Vogel 1989); or the study by Gerhard Braunthal of the Federation of German 
Industry during the 1950s (Braunthal 1965). Scholars working in the state autonomy or historical 
institutionalist traditions also utilise a pluralist perspective, often implicitly (Skocpol 1980; Hacker 
and Pierson 2002; Steinmo 1993; Immergut 1992).  
 As noted earlier, more recent research turned to variation in business influence and to the 
identification of the sources of that variation (for example, Bell and Hindmoor 2013; Woll 2014; 
Culpepper 2011). These studies thus turned away from framing the question of business power 
as an either/or issue; that is, power elite vs. pluralism; and towards a more empiricist perspective 
on business power. They suggest a view of business as sometimes, but not always, dominating 
political decisions. Yet, these studies also maintain an analytical focus on the influence of 
business on politics, and do not systematically look at the constraints that business has to 
confront.   In this approach, the causal arrows go from business to politics but never vice versa. 
In reality, business does not always get what it wants. Hence,  we lack an understanding of 
whether and if so, under what conditions, business interest groups adapt to other actors and their 
demands. 
 The insight that business sometimes adapts to political opponents, instead of fighting them, 
first emerged in research on welfare state history. Studies of the social policy legislation of the 
New Del era in the United States in particular showed how some segments of business adapted 
to changes in the political context by trying to influence the planned legislation rather than fight 
it, although the importance of adaptation and the decisiveness of business involvement for 
political outcomes remains disputed (key contributions to this debate are in particular Skocpol 
and Amenta 1985; Hacker and Pierson 2002; Swenson 2002; Gordon 1994; Quadagno 1984; 
Jenkins and Brents 1991; Domhoff and Webber 2011). 
 A related strand of research on business and politics shifted the focus from questions of 
power to questions of preferences. Studies in this strand focus on what business wants, rather 
than on how successful it is in getting what it wants. The literature on Varieties of Capitalism 
(VoC), inspired by the framework by Hall and Soskice (Hall and Soskice 2001), provided a major 
stimulus to this strand. Hall and Soskice expected that in coordinated market economies, major 
segments of employers will support institutions that underpin coordination among firms, 
whereby they see social policies as complementing such institutions (Hall and Soskice 2001; see 
also Rhodes 2005). Others expect that employers in coordinated market economies will support 
the adoption of social programs because of the type of skills they require (for example, Estévez-
Abe et al. 2001). In political economy, Germany is often seen as an archetypical case of 
coordination (for example Streeck 1997), which makes the country also a crucial case for testing 
VoC-inspired arguments.  
 This paper suggests a somewhat different perspective, one which explains employers’ 
support for social programs as a result of adaptation to changing political challenges and 
constraints, rather than of the needs of production. Germany provides a difficult case for testing 
this approach in so far as, according to the VoC approach, the institutional framework in 
Germany is favourable to the dominant segments of business. Hence, we can expect that 
business in Germany may have to adapt less to political constraints than in other countries. 
 In the following subsection, the paper presents a typology of business-politics relations that 
models how different response strategies by business will facilitate different outcomes. 
 
	  
	   4	  
3. How does business deal with political challenges? Two alternative strategies 
This section proposes a model for how to categorise business responses to political challenges, as 
well as the effects of these responses on political outcomes. As suggested earlier, business interest 
groups can respond to political challenges in two ways: confrontation and adaptation. 
Confrontation refers to efforts by business interest groups to push back or to defeat initiatives by 
political challengers. Confrontation can involve a variety of activities, for instance, public 
campaigning, lobbying, and donations to allied parties. Its defining characteristic, however, is that 
it attacks the policy proposals and arguments of a challenger head on in order to defeat them.  
 Adaptation, in contrast, refers to the accommodation of political challengers by making 
concessions to them. Business interest groups may pursue adaptation in order to exert influence 
in negotiations where the adoption of a policy cannot be stopped entirely or to pursue prioritised, 
overarching political goals, such as political stability and social peace, where confrontation would 
endanger these goals. In subsequent sections, we will analyse the implications of this choice for 
political outcomes, but first we need to turn to the concept of political challenges. 
 In this paper, the term ‘political challenges’ is used as an umbrella term for all initiatives by 
political actors that conflict with what business or a segment of it see as their interests. Political 
demands that challenge the interests of business can come from diverse agents: labour unions, 
social movements or political parties, for instance. The existence of such challengers does not in 
itself pose a threat to the political dominance of business interest groups. What is decisive is the 
stance taken by the government, that is, whether in a conflict government sides with business or 
with the challengers. Government itself can also be a challenger or a part of an alliance that acts 
as a challenger. Within government, it will typically be the ministers in charge, the senior staff in 
the ministries, and the parliamentary deputies of the governing parties, that decide on what stance 
the government shall take. Political challenges warrant a response by business only if government 
sides with the challengers or if government is itself the challenger. Therefore, I call a challenge 
‘strong’ if the government sides with the challenger or is itself the challenger, and ‘weak’ if the 
government does not (that is, if government either remains neutral or sides with business against 
a challenger). 
 This argument raises the question: What is business? I use the term ‘business’ as a short 
form for business interest groups. Business interest groups are political actors that explicitly 
represent the interest of private corporations, including their owners, shareholders and senior 
executives. Business interest groups can represent individual firms or groups of firms or even the 
entire national business community. The representativeness of business interest groups for the 
entire business community, all private firms in a country, will vary empirically, and a homogenous 
position for an entire business community cannot be assumed.  
 The interests of the business community can be homogenous or heterogeneous, depending 
on the character of the policy issue. On some issues, the business community may be divided, 
with different segments in conflict. On other issues business may act as a uniform actor. 
Different interests may also lead to different strategies. Some groups may opt for confrontation, 
others for adaptation. To give an example, calls by environmentalist groups for stricter emission 
standards for cars generally pose a challenge to manufacturers of gasoline-driven cars, while 
producers of electric cars may expect to gain a competitive advantage due to higher costs being 
imposed on their competitors. In this case, we can expect the two groups to pursue different 
response strategies, and the outcome to be affected by the balance of political strength among 
these producers. 
  This paper treats divisions within the business community as an empirical question rather 
than theorizing these divisions. We will return to the issue of divisions in the empirical sections 
and in the discussion (section IV). For the purpose of laying out the basic argument, we will 
assume  in the following section that a dominant segment within the business community exists, 
one whose influence on government is greater than that of other segments.  
 
3.1 The impact of business strategy on political outcomes: a two-dimensional typology 
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We now turn to the question of how the choice of strategy by business is likely to affect political 
outcomes. The previous section introduced two strategies, confrontation and adaptation, and 
argued that these two strategies represent alternative responses by business to political challenges. 
This section presents a fourfold typology of political scenarios, based on these two strategies. 
 I argue that the effect of the two strategies on policy decisions will differ depending on 
whether or not the challenger enjoys the support of the government. In principle, we can think 
of the possible outcomes of a conflict between business and a challenger as a continuum ranging 
from an outright defeat of business on the one end of the continuum to business dominance on 
the other end, with variants of political compromise in between. 
 Which outcome prevails will depend on a combination of two factors: (1) the strategy 
chosen by business in response to a challenge (adaptation or confrontation); and (2) the stance 
taken by the government, siding either with business or with the challenger. The interaction of 
these two sets of factors results in four possible ideal-typical scenarios, which can be represented 
as a cross-tab (table 1). I call these four scenarios (I) business-led social compromise, (II) 
imposed social compromise, (III) business dominance, and (IV) business defeat. 
[TABLE ONE ABOUT HERE] 
 
These four concepts represent hypothetical political outcomes for each of these four possible 
scenarios. If government sides with business and business decides to adapt we can expect variant 
I, what I call a business-led compromise.  A business-led compromise is a policy arrangement that is 
engineered by the government and that reflects the preferences of the dominant segment of the 
business community; however, the business-led compromise also includes some concessions to 
the challengers, although on terms acceptable to business.  
 A second possibility is an imposed compromise (II), which results if government sides with the 
challenger and business adapts to that constraint. This is likely to produce a compromise whereby 
business accepts some policies that it does not favour while also obtaining some concessions or 
managing to avert actions that would be even less favourable. Imposed compromise differs from 
the business-led compromise in that the concessions imposed on business are more substantial.  
 The third possible variant is business dominance (III), which results when business seeks 
confrontation with challengers while government sides with business. In this scenario of 
offensive confrontation, the adopted policies will not reflect the outcome of a political 
compromise but solely the preferences of business. In so far as government is subservient to 
business in this case, this outcome reflects the Marxian thesis of the capitalist state as being an 
instrument of the needs and interests of capitalists.  
 Finally, the fourth scenario, business defeat (IV) results if business pursues confrontation 
even though political challengers are strong. In this scenario of defensive confrontation, 
government sides against business, and business is unwilling to give in despite being in a position 
of political weakness. The result is a defeat for business. 
 The typology shows that for business, confrontation is a more risky strategy than adaption, 
as confrontation can lead to defeat, and is thus a high-gain/high-risk strategy; while adaptation 
will result in some form of compromise, thus making extreme outcomes less likely. 
Confrontation can lead to outright defeat because it excludes the possibility of influencing details 
of policies through consultations and negotiations, while adaptation, precisely because it requires 
concessions by all sides, is unlikely to result in outright defeat. For business interest groups that 
prioritise predictability of political outcomes, there are incentives to opt for a strategy of 
adaptation. However, confrontation can be a more promising strategy for business either if 
political opponents are weak (offensive confrontation) or if the stakes are very high for business 
(defensive confrontation). 
 Critics of this typology might argue that empirically, business dominance (cell III) is the 
most prevalent outcome and that those instances in which business confronts intense political 
challenges are empirically rare. However,  the four episodes discussed in this paper, focusing on 
social policy and industrial relations in Germany, provide evidence of all four types of responses. 
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 The  two dimensions, political challenge and response strategy, may be correlated. Business 
may be more likely to adapt if constraints are strong. We can thus expect that cells II and III will 
be more populated. While the empirical analysis of this paper documents instances of all four 
types, the limited number of cases studied does not allow us to make conclusive statements about 
the empirical distribution of the four types. What we can document, however, is that business 
adaptation to political challenges occurred in Germany under some conditions, and that the 
choice of  response strategy, adaptation or confrontation, had important consequences for the 
political outcomes. 
 
4. Political challenges and business response strategies in welfare state history: A case 
study of Germany 
This section applies the typology described above to four reform episodes from the development 
of social programs and industrial relations in Germany. The section shows the effect of business 
interest groups’ choice of strategy on political outcomes. Four reforms episodes are presented, 
two of which are examples of adaptation and two of confrontation. The episodes are: the 
adoption of work injury insurance in the 1880s (an instance of adaptation), the adoption of 
unemployment insurance in the 1920s (adaptation), the adoption of mandatory board-level 
codetermination in 1950/1951 (confrontation), and the reform of labour markets in the early 
2000s (confrontation). The analysis will seek to show how the choice of strategy by business, 
together with different levels of constraints, led to different outcomes, resulting in either a 
success for business, a defeat of business or a social compromise. 
 The four episodes are taken from very different historical periods, and we therefore need 
to ask how the different strategies relate to differences in historical context. The Wilhelmine 
Empire, the Weimar Republic, and the post-war Federal Republic provided very disparate 
settings for business-politics relations and for the opponents of business to launch challenges. 
The Wilhelmine Empire can be described as a semi-democratic monarchy, with free elections but 
unequal voting rights, whose government was accountable to the Emperor, rather than to the 
parliament. Relations between the dominant sectors of industry, heavy industry in particular, and 
the government were friendly and close (see Kaelble 1967), and anti-socialist legislation, in place 
from 1878 to 1890, limited mobilization by socialist organisations. This was a context where 
business was in a dominant position and where opponents could hardly launch strong challenges. 
 The Weimar Republic provides a very different context. Industrialists were now in a much 
weaker political position. Democratization had enabled the Social Democrats and the Catholic 
Centre Party to enter government, and unions and collective bargaining were now institutionally 
protected, in contrast to the Empire. In Weimar, works councils were also now legally 
mandatory. Business was thus much more constrained. Parts of industry never fully accepted the 
enhanced role of unions.  After World War II, Similar constraints continued in the Federal 
Republic, but the dominant groups in industry were now willing to accept an institutionally 
protected role for the unions.  
 The following subsections will document how differences in the strength of political 
challenges combined with different response strategies by business to produce different 
outcomes in terms of the degree of business dominance, leading to defeat, compromise or 
victory for business interests. 
  
4.1 Adaptation to a weak challenge: Bismarck’s social reforms 
The introduction of social insurance in Germany during the 1880s was an initiative by the 
government in cooperation with dominant segments within industry. The reforms consisted of 
the adoption of three new public programs: accident insurance, health insurance, and old-age and 
disability pensions.  
 The dominant segments within business supported these reforms. The large firms in heavy 
industry were worried about worker militancy. An alliance between heavy industry and the 
national government drove and shaped the reform project, with a view to pacifying workers and 
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weakening the appeal of the social democrats. The heavy industry sector had initially wanted to 
protect its own company welfare programs, but it later agreed to shift responsibility to publicly 
run programs, seeing a public social policy as a more effective way to secure political stability. 
Heavy industry’s support for public insurance thus reflected an adaptation to the need for 
political stability. In contrast to the heavy industry sector, German manufacturers were less 
supportive of the reform, but they lacked political clout since they were still small and less well 
organised. 
 The Central Association of German Industry (Centralverband deutscher Industrie, CDI) 
which was dominated by heavy industry, played an important role in the drafting of the German 
social insurance bills (Bueck 1903). The executive director of the CDI, Henry Axel Bueck, called 
the reforms ‘a work of civilization of the highest order, which, as a model for all times, will bring 
[the Empire] honour’ (Bueck 1905). 
 The attention of heavy industry was focused primarily on work injury insurance and less on 
the other two programs. Lobbying by heavy industry played an important role in the adoption of 
work injury insurance. The adoption of an employers’ liability law in 1871 had created a wave of 
lawsuits by injured workers against their employers and had fuelled industrial conflicts. The work 
injury-prone heavy industry thus looked for a way to defuse this source of conflict and to shift 
the costs of compensation to the broader business community. On 2 November 1880, the 
executive director of the heavy industry firm Bochumer Verein, Louis Baare, assembled a group of 
like-minded industry representatives to draft a new work injury insurance program (Breger 1994) 
that would replace employers’ liability. The government bill was based largely on this industry-led 
proposal. 
 Opinions on the adoption of work injury insurance among the broader business 
community were mixed. A survey by the Prussian Statistical Office in 1881 found that 53 per 
cent of all regional Chambers of Commerce backed the government draft, while 39 per cent 
opposed it (Francke 1881). Yet it was heavy industry that remained the dominant actor within 
industry. It had cooperated with Bismarck already earlier in the debate about trade protectionism 
in the 1870s and, unlike other sectors, heavy industry could rely on unified and powerful 
organizations, particularly the aforementioned CDI. 
 The adoption of social insurance programs during the Bismarck era shows characteristics 
of a business-government alliance. The success of this alliance was made possible by the 
adaptation behaviour of dominant parts of business to the plans of the government and the 
perceived need to do something about ‘the worker questions’. While the reforms was certainly 
worker-friendly, German labour unions and Social Democrats had little influence on the actual 
adoption and design of these programs. Although the reforms were motivated by a fear of labour 
militancy, the organizations of the labour movements were still very weak at that time, compared 
to later periods. The growth of the labour unions did not start before the 1890s, and anti-socialist 
legislation, adopted in 1878, stifled political mobilization by the newly founded Social Democratic 
Party. During the entire period of  reform (1878-1889), the Social Democrats never held more 
than 12 per cent of the seats in parliament.  
 Heavy industry exercised an authoritarian approach of labour management (Büren 1934) 
and was not yet constrained by a collective bargaining system. The political influence of heavy 
industry was at its peak during the Wilhelmine Empire and would never again achieve such 
strength in later periods. Heavy industry’s fear of a potential future strengthening of the labour 
movement and an intensification of class conflict motivated it to promote social reforms rather 
than the actual strength of organised labour. In pre-empting organised labour, heavy industry also 
succeeded in shaping many details of the new laws, such as the exclusion of union funds from 
the new public health insurance program. 
 In sum, the adoption of work injury insurance, health insurance, and old-age pensions 
under Bismarck was the product of a business-government alliance, and both sides responded to 
the perceived challenge of labour militancy. Key segments of the business community; heavy 
industry in particular; actively backed this reform project and shaped the details of the new social 
	  
	   8	  
programs. The character of the reforms as a social compromise was implicit, as industrialists 
expected workers to acquiesce and to turn away from the Social Democrats as a result of better 
social protection. One employer representative, for instance, remarked that ‘the best way to 
weaken the power of the Social Democrats is to fulfil that part of their demands that every 
philanthropist must accept as legitimate’ (Oechelhäuser 1889).  
 In short, the political challenges to which business adapted were more imagined than real. 
The perceived challenge of labour radicalism united government and the dominant segments 
within industry to cooperate in the formation of social insurance programs. 
 
4.2 Adaptation to a strong challenge: the adoption of unemployment insurance 
The adoption of unemployment insurance in 1927 is one example of a political compromise that 
was accepted by the main business federations in the face of a clear parliamentary majority in 
favour of the reform. Initially, all business interest groups strongly opposed unemployment 
insurance. When it became clear that the passing of the law could not be stopped, the main 
business federations decided to cooperate with government elites to hammer out details of the 
bill. By supporting a compromise, German business could secure concessions on details that 
mattered to them.   
 The initiative for the bill came from the Ministry of Labour and its head, Heinrich Brauns, 
a priest and member of the Catholic Centre Party. The democratization of the political system 
with the Weimar constitution (1919) and the participation of the Social Democrats and the 
Centre Party in government had resulted in a parliamentary majority for the adoption of 
unemployment insurance. This situation was in stark contrast to the period before 1918, when no 
such majority existed. Moreover, the main unions backed a public insurance program after 1918, 
when the unions’ own compensation schemes (known as the ‘Ghent model’) became financially 
unviable. 
  During the Wilhelmine Empire (1871-1918), all groups of employers had been staunchly 
opposed to any form of support to the unemployed, primarily because they feared an erosion of 
work incentives due to an increase in workers’ reservation wage, that is, the wage level below 
which unemployed workers are expected to refuse a job offer (Zahnbrecher 1914; Reiswitz 
1904). Employers suspected that the possibility to obtain unemployment benefits would induce 
laziness and reduce labour supply. After the First World War, the political context had changed 
for several reasons: first, during the war, a means-tested program for assisting the unemployed 
had been introduced, initially only for the period of the war, but effectively made permanent after 
the war. Second, the pro-welfare parliamentary majority and the participation of pro-welfare 
parties in government made the dismantling of this program unfeasible.  
 During the early years of Weimar, employers initially maintained their opposition to 
unemployment insurance. Over time, however, they came to realise that opposition was 
pointless. The two main employer federations, the Federation of German Employer Associations 
(VDA, Vereinigung deutscher Arbeitgeberverbände) and the Federation of German Industry 
(Reichsverband deutscher Industrie, RDI), eventually decided to cooperate with the ministry and 
the unions in hammering out the details of a bill for unemployment insurance. With this strategy, 
the two employer federations hoped to be able to dilute some of the more unpleasant aspects of  
the planned program and influence those provisions of the bill they particularly cared about, such 
as making benefits conditional on employment record, control of benefit recipients by the public 
labour exchanges, and the involvement of the employers’ associations in the administration of 
the new program. In all these respects, employers got their way.  
 Parliament passed the bill based on the draft worked out by unions and employers in June 
1927. The bill had the support of the Social Democrats, the Centre Party, and two smaller centre-
right parties (German People’s Party and he German Democratic Party), which together held 57 
per cent of the votes. 
 The strategic motives of the business federations are documented in archival sources. On 
16 December 1929, the social policy committee of the RDI, by a vote of 16 to 5, decided to 
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abandon its opposition to unemployment insurance. The chair of the committee, Hubert Hoff, 
pointed out that unemployment insurance would be the lesser evil compared to unemployment 
assistance, because ‘if …unemployment assistance continues, the employer has no influence over 
the use of the funds.’ At the same time, Hoff considered a dismantling of unemployment 
assistance without any replacement as unrealistic; thus, unemployment insurance was seen as the 
lesser evil (RDI 1921). Similarly, the social policy committee of the VDA, in a meeting on 27 
January 1925, decided that a continuation of opposition would stand  ‘no reasonable chance’ of 
success (VDA 1925). 
 The adoption of unemployment insurance resulted from a compromise between employers 
and unions, engineered by the ministry, in the shadow of a clear majority in parliament. 
Employers grudgingly cooperated because they knew that a majority in parliament supported the 
introduction of unemployment insurance and that the government could thus go ahead 
unilaterally. The business federations thus adapted to political majorities and the government’s 
plans, thereby enabling a compromise solution. 
 
4.3 Confrontation of a weak challenge: labour market reforms in the 2000s 
The labour market reforms in Germany during the early 2000s provide an example of business 
choosing confrontation and succeeding in its goals due to weak political constraints. Many 
economists attributed high unemployment in the 1990s to tightly regulated labour markets and 
high non-wage labour costs associated with high social expenditures (for example Sinn 2003). 
During the 1990s, academic and journalistic observers of German politics diagnosed a deadlock 
in the reform efforts due to the semi-sovereign character of the German state  with its many veto 
points (for example Streeck and Trampusch 2005). 
 Nevertheless, the reforms were ultimately enacted. The Social Democrats came to power in 
1998 with a promise of lowering unemployment. The Government, consisting of Social 
Democrats and the Greens, initially aimed to hammer out a negotiated reform of labour markets 
through a tripartite body, known as the Alliance for Jobs, formed in 1998. These talks failed due 
to deadlocks between unions and employers. The employers threatened to leave the talks, stating 
that the unions’ proposals did not go far enough to lower  labour costs and liberalise labour 
markets (Der Spiegel, 1 March 1999: 26). Employers and unions both supported financing of social 
insurance through payroll taxes, but the two sides were at odds on the issue of deregulating 
labour markets and facilitating new forms of less protected low-wage employment. 
 After the failure of the Alliance for Jobs talks, the Schröder government set up an expert 
committee mandated to work out proposals for labour market reforms intended to create jobs, 
known as Agenda 2010. Business representatives played a prominent role in the committee, which 
was chaired by the personnel director of Volkswagen, Peter Hartz. Experts from the business 
consultancies of Roland Berger and McKinsey were among the members. Unlike in the Alliance 
for Jobs talks, the unions held no veto rights. Only two of the twenty-one members came from 
the unions.  
 The proposals of the committee focused on strengthening work incentives, activation of 
the unemployed, and expansion of low-wage work, that is, supply-side reforms that were fully in 
line with the demands advanced by the Federation of German Employer Associations (BDA 
2005; BDA 1998). The c most controversial component of the committee’s proposals was the 
partial replacement of unemployment insurance for the long-term unemployed with a means-
tested benefit (Arbeitslosengeld II).  
 During the 1990s, the employer associations had begun to conduct and finance public 
campaigns to deregulate labour markets; one example are the activities of the employer-funded 
think tank ‘Initiative New Social Market Economy’ (Kinderman 2005; Menz 2005; Kinderman 
2016). Campaigns like these aimed at increasing public support for labour market liberalization 
and lower labour costs. 
 In this case, the political constraints were weak. The measures proposed by the Hartz 
committee were in line with the demands issued by the Federation of German Employers 
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Associations (Bundesvereinigung deutscher Arbeitgeberverbände, BDA), the Federation of 
German Industry (Bundesvereinigung Deutscher Industrie, BDI) and other employers’ 
associations.  
 Opposition to the reforms came from the left wing within the SDP and from some of the 
unions. The unions were divided into a traditionalist camp, led by the metalworkers (IG Metal), 
and a modernizing, reform-minded camp, led by the chemical and mining workers (IG BCE). 
Thus, the government, under the impression of high problem pressure, decided it could afford to 
ignore the opposition to the reforms (Hassel and Schiller 2010). In parliament, a broad coalition 
that included the Christian Democrats and the Free Democrats, both in opposition, backed a 
deregulation of labour markets. In short, the Agenda 2010 labour market reforms were a case 
where the government ended up siding with the declared preferences of the dominant segment 
within the business community.  This emboldened employers to pursue a strategy of 
confrontation of the opponents of the reform, and at the same time the need for adaptation was 
weak. 
 The employer associations pursued a strategy of confrontation from a self-aware position 
of strength. This strategy took the form of vociferous public campaigning for lower labour costs, 
easing of regulations to create low-wage jobs, more flexible types of employment, and stricter job 
search requirements for the unemployed. Given the favourable context, this strategy of 
confrontation was successful. A recent study by Kinderman finds that after public opinion had 
shifted to the left following these reforms, the employer associations toned down their 
confrontationist stances on labour market and social policy issues (see aKinderman 2016). In this 
case, employers’ perception of their strength induced them to pursue confrontation rather than 
to adapt to the demands of the unions by offering concessions. 
  
4.4 Confronting a strong challenge: the introduction of board-level co-determination 
The legislation of mandatory parity codetermination in heavy industry, enacted in 1951, provides 
an example of political confrontation under strong political constraints. Parity codetermination 
refers to the representation of employees in the supervisory boards of large firms, with 
employees having the same number of seats as owners. The Montan Codetermination Law of 1951 
made board-level codetermination mandatory for all firms in coal mining, as well as iron and steel 
production. Employees received the right to appoint half the seats in the supervisory board, as 
well as the right to appoint one member of the executive board, the labour director.  
 Industry vehemently opposed the introduction of mandatory parity codetermination. 
Industrialists saw board-level codetermination as a piecemeal strategy of expropriation and 
nationalization. Walter Raymond, the president of the Federation of German Employers’ 
Associations (BDA) argued that codetermination’s ‘decisive characteristic is its aim of abolishing 
private property as the means of production’ (quoted in Bunn 1958). Industrialists’ view of 
board-level codetermination as ‘socialism in disguise’ is not surprising, because the unions 
themselves saw it as a tool to gain control of the economy. For German unions at that time, 
board-level codetermination was just one element of a more comprehensive program of 
economic democracy. In this program,  economic decisions at all levels; the plant, the sectorial, 
and the national level; would ultimately be governed by bipartite corporatist bodies (Van Hook 
2004; Napthali 1928). 
 Why did union demands for codetermination make it to the national political agenda at that 
time? The answer lies in decisions by the Allies and the interest of the German government to 
secure the unions’ support for the political-economic integration of the newly created West 
German state into the Western capitalist economies and the institutions of the European 
Community. The Allied occupation authority had confiscated the large heavy industry combines 
in the Ruhr area and had plans to re-structure ownership. The North German Iron and Steel 
Control (NGISC), the Allied agency in charge of re-organizing heavy industry, decided to seek 
the cooperation of German unions. As a concession, the NGISC, in 1947, offered board-level 
codetermination in the iron and steel firms it controlled. The management and former owners of 
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the affected firms were excluded from the talks between the unions and the NGISC (Thum 
1982).  
 Two years later, the newly elected conservative-liberal government, headed by Adenauer as 
Chancellor, decided to make parity codetermination in heavy industry permanent. The 
government’s goal was to ensure unions’ consent to the government’s broader economic and 
foreign policies, policies that conflicted with the unions’ own economic policy program, 
specifically the decision to abandon all plans for nationalization and centralised economic 
planning. The government wanted to return the heavy industry firms to their old owners. In the 
meantime, the Allies had lost interest in a re-organization of heavy industry and decided to grant 
the German government autonomy on these issues, as long as the conflict over codetermination 
would be resolved.  
 The government, needing the cooperation of the unions, decided to ignore the 
industrialists on this issue. Adenauer urged industry and unions to find a compromise on 
codetermination, but the protracted negotiations, begun in May 1950, came to no result due to 
the intransigence of the industry representatives.  The president of the Federation of German 
Industry, Fritz Berg, declared that ‘ industry sees in these negotiations, which take place under 
the threat of a political strike, a fatal shock to the authority of the state’ ((quoted in Berghahn 
1985). 
 The unions threatened a nationwide strike and both sides called on Chancellor Adenauer to 
mediate. In January 1951, Adenauer held separate consultations with both sides. By the end of 
the month, unions and industry had reached a compromise, which parliament then passed into 
two laws. The compromise consisted of the institutionalization of mandatory parity co-
determination in heavy industry (coal mining and iron and steel production), and a weaker form 
of codetermination in firms with more than 500 employees outside of heavy industry, by which 
employees had only one third of the votes in the supervisory board.  
 The conflicts over the legislation of mandatory board-level codetermination in the early 
post-war period (1947-51)  are an example of political confrontation. Rather than adapting to 
political constraints, business in this case decided to stand firm and fight, even though the odds 
were against it. Both sides resorted to public campaigning and lobbying. Unlike in the case of 
unemployment insurance, employers did not seek a compromise or cooperate with state elites, 
even though the political odds were against them in both cases. 
 The case of codetermination thus shows that political constraints do not always induce 
business to adapt. Why did German business choose not to accommodate to political constraints 
in the case of codetermination, while it did so in the case of Bismarck’s reforms and of 
unemployment insurance? The most likely explanation lies in the difference in importance of the 
policy issues at stake. Codetermination goes to the core of business control over firms. In 
contrast, social insurance programs, while they may raise labour costs and may weaken work 
incentives, do not infringe on the fundamental autonomy of entrepreneurs. They are costs of 
doing business, but not threats to business ownership as such. The analysis suggests that the 
willingness of business to adapt to political challenges correlates inversely to the importance of 
the policy issue for business. The more central the policy issue (in the view of business), the 
lesser the willingness to adapt and thus the greater the likelihood that business will deploy 
confrontation to defend its interests. 
 
5. Discussion 
The four cases studied have illustrated two different strategies of German business interest 
groups in responding to political challenges: adaptation and confrontation. In the case of the 
adoption of work injury, health insurance, and pensions under Bismarck and the adoption of 
unemployment insurance in the Weimar Republic, business interest groups adapted and were 
willing to accept policies that they had initially opposed. In contrast, business sought 
confrontation during the adoption of codetermination and the labour market reforms of the early 
2000s. The motives behind this confrontation, however, were very different in the two cases. In 
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the case of codetermination, confrontation was defensive. It was the attack on ownership control 
that induced confrontation. In the case of the Agenda 2010 reforms, confrontation was 
offensive. Its goal was to change public opinion in order to achieve the desired reforms. In other 
words, in the case of codetermination, business was clearly on the defensive, while in the case of 
the Agenda 2010 reform, business was in an advantageous position and used confrontation to 
strengthen its hand further. 
 The main factor behind why business pursued adaptation in some cases and confrontation 
in others appears to be importance of the policy issues on the agenda to the interests of business. 
Policy proposals that challenge the interests of business more thoroughly than others are deemed 
more important, while other policy issues, of lower priority, lend themselves toward more 
compromise and adaptation. In the cases described above, proposals for board-level 
codetermination restricted the decision-making powers of owners by requiring them to share this 
power with employees.  In contrast, the adoption and expansion of social programs does not 
interfere with decisions by individual firms. Social programs may raise labour costs or reduce 
labour supply, but theses issues are less central to business than questions of ownership and 
control. The analysis thus suggests that a determination of whether business will pursue 
adaptation or confrontation will depend on the importance of policy issues to business.  
 The analysis also finds changes in business strategy over time. Actors may alternate 
between confrontation and adaptation, rather than sticking with only one of the two. One pattern 
identified empirically is a shift from confrontation to adaptation in the course of the policy-
making process. Confrontation may appear to business as the right strategy in the early stages of 
a conflict, while adaptation may appear more effective at later stages. This is because 
confrontation may achieve a shift in the broader political agenda, while adaptation can only shape 
details. The attitudes of German business toward the introduction of unemployment insurance 
provide an example. Business interest associations initially campaigned forcefully against 
unemployment insurance, while in the later stages of policy-making, the major federations 
adapted. As the analysis has shown, this shift of strategy was a response to changes in 
government and in parliamentary majorities. In the struggle over codetermination, in contrast, 
business did not switch to adaptation, despite similar constraints. As suggested earlier, the 
persistence of a confrontation strategy reflects the fact that ownership is less negotiable for 
business than labour costs. 
 The case studies also point to the relevance of heterogeneity in the political strategies of 
business. In the case of the Bismarckian social reforms, heavy industry and textiles pursued a 
strategy of adaptation: industrial actors went along with the government plans to offer social 
protection to workers. In contrast, the manufacturing sector was less supportive of public social 
insurance (Ullmann 1979). In the case of unemployment insurance, the major national 
federations shifted to adaptation, while some groups, representing smaller firms and agriculture, 
remained in confrontation mode. In the two cases of confrontation, codetermination and the 
Agenda 2010 labour market reforms,  intra-business heterogeneity did not play a major role. It 
thus appears that adaptation is more likely to induce disunity within business. Confrontation 
involves the perception of a common opponent and may thus help to mollify internal 
disagreements. In contrast, adaptation often involves a difficult weighting of costs and benefits, 
where some segments may see the benefits of adaptation as outweighing the sacrifices, while 
others may perceive the concessions required as too costly. In the case of the Bismarckian 
reforms, the manufacturing sector, being more vulnerable to price competition due to a larger of 
competitors and smaller firms size, was more sensitive to cost increases than heavy industry, as 
cartels and syndicates limited price competition in the later sector. Similarly, in the case of 
unemployment insurance, larger firms were better able to shoulder the costs of adaptation and 
the larger firms dominated the employer federations. 
 What implications does the analysis presented here have for debates about business power? 
Our findings suggest a modified version of pluralism, one that acknowledges that business 
interest groups enjoy power and influence, while at the same time recognizing the significance of 
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variation in business influence. The four cases taken from German history show that the ability 
of business interest groups to prevail in political conflicts varies considerably. Proponents of the 
business dominance thesis may challenge this perspective in two ways. First, they might argue 
that an analysis of four reforms taken from one country is insufficient to document the empirical 
prevalence of variation and that an analysis of a larger number of cases would show business 
dominance (cell III) to be the most frequent outcome. There is clearly a need for testing the 
relevance of the model presented in this paper in other countries. Nevertheless, the studies 
discussed in section 2 suggest that variation in business influence is also significant in other 
countries. This suggests, in turn, that differences in response strategies by business are not simply 
a German affair, but are likely to take place elsewhere. 
  Second, one might argue that the variation across the two dimensions is limited due to the 
structural character of business power in which  the range of policy options that are politically 
viable are limited. This is without doubt true, as no government can ignore the expectations of 
firms and investors at will, as Lindblom and others have argued (Lindblom 1982). Yet, this 
structural dependence merely poses limited conditions. It does not determine the influence of 
business on political decisions. Investigating how business interest groups respond to political 
challenges can produce a more nuanced and more precise understanding of how these responses 
affect political outcomes. The outcome of conflicts between business and other political actors is 
not pre-determined. Business does not always get what it wants.  The extent to which business 
interests prevail in political conflicts is  affected by both the political strength of these challengers 
and the response strategies business decides to pursue.  
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Table 1. Two dimensions of business-politics relations: challenge and response strategy 
Strength of challenge (columns): 
____________________________________ 
Type of response strategy  (rows): 
Weak challenge 
(government sides 











Confrontation Business dominance  
(III) 
 
Business defeat (IV) 
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